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META P HYSICS IN DOGEN 
Kevin Schilbrack 
 
It is my hypothesis that metaphysics is an overlooked but fruitful category for cross- 
cultural philosophy, and I would like to demonstrate this hypothesis with what may 
seem an unpromising example, the writings of the Zen Buddhist teacher Dogen 
Kigen (1200-1253). The first section of this essay introduces a definition of meta- 
physics that, although drawn from the Western philosophical tradition, is, I hope, 
generic enough to be useful for the study of philosophy outside the West, and then 
argues for the legitimacy of metaphysics as an interpretative tool for the under- 
standing of Zen Buddhist thought. The second section spells out what I take to be 
the basic features of Dogen's metaphysics, and the third deals with a rival non- 
metaphysical interpretation of Dogen's philosophy. 
The Very Idea of Metaphysics in the Study of Zen Thought 
In saying that a philosopher is interested in "metaphysics," I mean that he or she is 
interested in an inquiry into the character of being qua being, or (if one wants to 
avoid the implication that all things are substances) one can say that metaphysics 
concerns the character of reality qua reality or reality as such. Because metaphysics 
concerns reality "as such," a metaphysical statement describes things that exist-for 
example a cherry tree- not in those somewhat general features that it shares with 
other cherry trees (which would be botany), but rather in those completely general 
features it shares with anything else. I will argue that some of Dogen's writings reflect 
an interest in this kind of inquiry into the character that reality has as such. More- 
over, some thinkers in the West have argued that metaphysical claims about the 
generic features of reality as such are best understood not as empirical claims that 
may or may not be the case, but rather as logically necessary claims concerning the 
conditions for the possibility of anything existing at all. They therefore describe what 
must be the case, and if they are true, then they are true in every possible world. On 
this understanding of metaphysics, which I will call transcendental metaphysics, 
metaphysical claims are unrestricted existential statements that purport to be true in 
every conceivable state of affairs.1 They are transcendental not in the sense that they 
describe a realm that transcends the phenomenal one, but rather in the sense that 
they describe the features of things without which they would not exist at all. 
Dogen's metaphysical claims also seem to meet this narrower definition. 
The term "metaphysical" carries other connotations as well that I would not 
ascribe to Dogen. For some thinkers, "metaphysical “or” transcendental11 
philosophies has to do with supernatural realities or speculative thought 
unconnected to experience. 
  
There is a powerful tendency to take metaphysical statements that describe the 
general or abstract features of all concrete realities as statements describing a special 
class of objects. But, to repeat, "metaphysics" refers here to the generic features of 
this world and not to some other world. Moreover, I am not suggesting that Dogen 
is "really" a metaphysician, even in my sense of metaphysics, or even that he 
is "really" a philosopher, as opposed to a religious teacher or the founder of 
a school. I claim not that I am presenting the essence of Dogen but only that, 
among other things, Dogen makes metaphysical claims, and thus that important 
aspects of his thought are missed if one does not see them as metaphysical. 
The idea that, in addition to being the founder of the Soto Zen school in Japan, 
Dogen can be labeled a philosopher is no longer new, but the claim that his 
philosophy includes metaphysics may strike many as strange. Scholarship on Zen 
thought has moved beyond the Orientalist conceit that Zen is a nonrational or non- 
philosophical form of discourse, but the idea that Zen is nonmetaphysical remains. 
Metaphysics continues to seem an inappropriate tool for understanding Buddhist 
thinkers in general because, according to some interpretations at least, this is a 
religion that explicitly rejects metaphysical inquiry. The Buddha is famously 
represented as saying in the Majjhima Nikaya that certain views are not part of his 
teaching, and that pursuing these questions is like being a person shot by a highly 
poisoned arrow who wants to know the kind of man who shot it, the type of bow 
and arrow, and so on, rather than let the doctor save his life.2 Such views do not 
help one abandon attachments, overcome suffering, or attain Nibbana; they are 
"not even the begin- ning of the Noble Practice." 3 This passage (and others} has 
often been read as saying that Buddhism is too pragmatic to include metaphysics. 
Dogen, too, may seem to reject the relevance of metaphysics. Like Gautama, 
Dogen rejects certain speculative questions as irrelevant to liberating practice.4 
And like other Zen teachers, Dogen sometimes states that the true Buddhist 
teaching is transmitted directly, without discursive means.5 According to Dogen, 
the proper goal of Zen is a way of being, characterized by what he calls the 
"harmonization of body and mind," and he recommends a number of practices to 
help achieve this, including, especially, seated meditation (zazen 坐禅) under 
the direction of a master.0 Metaphysical speculation is no substitute for this 
harmonization; it cannot even lead to it In fact, it may seem that pursuing 
metaphysical questions actually hinders liberating practice, insofar as 
intellectualism stems from attachment to self.7 Dogen's Buddhism there- fore may 
seem to reject intellectual pursuits, including metaphysics, in favor of a somatic 
practice designed to inculcate selflessness and nonattachment. In short, one might 
argue that Buddhism in general and Dogen's Buddhism in particular reject 
metaphysics on the grounds that the Buddhist path is practical, not speculative. For 
these reasons, it may seem that one can judge a priori that to interpret Dogen's 
teaching as metaphysical would be inappropriate and distorting. 
However, the claim that Buddhism is completely antimetaphysical is false. It is 
true that Buddhism, like religions generally, typically shows little interest in meta- 
physical knowledge for its own sake. But Buddhism, like religions generally, does 
show an interest in the idea of metaphysical knowledge pursued as part of trans- 
  
forming one's perceptions, affects, and character in order to be in accord with the 
true nature of things. It is also true that Buddhism typically rejects those forms of 
metaphysics that claim that things in general and selves in particular are enduring 
substances. But this is only to say that Buddhists reject what they consider bad 
metaphysics, not metaphysics as such.8 
I believe that the same is true of Dogen. In fact, the idea that Dogen's Zen is 
antimetaphysical is even more suspect, for among Zen teachers Dogen is perhaps 
the one who values reason most highly. Especially relevant here is Dogen's 
revalorization of both language and logic.9 For Dogen, the use of reason is an integral 
part of Zen practice,10 and therefore one cannot assume that Dogen's Zen does 
not in- clude metaphysics on the grounds that Zen is inevitably transmitted outside 
words or logic. To be sure, reason for Dogen is not merely intellectual assent to a 
truth but rather its authentication with the whole of one's person. In Dogen's terms, 
one understands neither with mind alone nor with body alone, but with one's "body- 
mind."11 But this only describes how the teachings are authenticated, and does not 
rule out the possibility that the teachings are metaphysical in scope. In general, I 
believe, Dogen's criticisms of "pursuing words and following after speech" (as in the 
quote from the Fukanzazengi 普勧坐禅儀 in endnote 4) should not be read as the 
rejection of language or logic. Rather, they should be seen in the context of sectarian 
conflicts, where they serve as criticisms of the claim that reading sOtras and 
practicing the nembutsu rather than zazen are the proper Zen practice. 
It is true that interpreters from one culture to another need to take care not 
to impose their own philosophical categories blindly, but to treat Dogen as non- 
metaphysical is no guarantee that one has done this. On the contrary, nonmeta 
physical categories such as "pragmatic,"  "phenomenological “or  “nonra t ional" 
are equally Western and run an equal risk of distorting their object. So I conclude 
that the arguments that metaphysics is always an inappropriate tool for under- 
standing Dogen fail. 
The issue of the presence of metaphysics in Dogen's writings is also complicated 
by the rise of the Critical Buddhism (Hihan Bukkyo 批判仏教) movement. 12 This 
movement argues that certain metaphysical claims (such as those concerning 
original enlightenment or Buddha-nature) are not truly Buddhist. They have 
challenged Dogen studies by their claim that at the end of his life Dogen came to 
reject these views. My response is that there are a number of basic Buddhist 
teachings that Dogen maintains consistently throughout his career, such as 
impermanence, de- pendent arising, and momentariness.  The issue pursued in this 
essay is the philo- sophical question concerning the logical status of these themes  
in Dogen, not the historical question of whether the metaphysical views I discuss 
represent Dogen's final position or the "Buddhological" or sectarian question of 
whether these meta- physical views represent true Buddhism. I therefore focus on the 
seventy-five-fascicle 
Shobogenzo 正法眼蔵 without implying any position about its composition or its 
relation to the twelve-fascicle Shobogenzo. My issue is simply whether a n d  in what 
sense one might speak of metaphysics in Dogen's Shobogenzo, especially the 
seventy-five-fascicle version. 13 
 
 
 
  
 
Several interpreters have described Dogen's work as metaphysical, though unfortu- 
nately they do not define the term.14 This section aims to unpack Dogen's meta- 
physics, which is to say his understanding of the character of reality as such. It first 
outlines Dogen's account of the character of reality as such, which is in large part 
simply Dogen's explanation of the idea of dependent arising. The second part of this 
section then seeks to show how this metaphysical account figures in the religious or 
soteriological context of liberation from suffering. The third part argues that Dogen's 
prima facie metaphysical claims about the character of reality as such are most 
plausibly interpreted as a version of transcendental metaphysics, in the sense 
introduced above that they seek to describe the conditions for the possibility of the 
existence of anything whatsoever. 
 
Reality as Such in Dogen's Zen. 
What is, according to Dogen, is temporal. In fact, it is not correct to say that all 
things exist in time; rather, all things are time. Each thing is a unit of time. "The rat is 
time, the tiger is time, sentient beings are time, buddhas are time." 15 Pine trees and 
bamboos, mountains and seas, self and other are really time. 16 Time has colors; 
good and evil are times.17 "You must see all the various things of the whole world as 
so many times." 18 
What does it mean to say that things are times? When one asks what kind of 
entity reality is composed of, the answers often fall into one of the two categories 
defined by the contrast of being and becoming. That is, metaphysical reflections 
often take either space or time as one's root metaphor and then articulate an account 
of reality as such with either spatial units (atoms, substances, matter) or temporal 
units (events, moments, occasions) as the basic model of an individual. The result is 
some form of substance metaphysics or some form of process metaphysics. In terms 
of this contrast, Dogen clearly opposes substance metaphysics and articulates a form 
of process metaphysics. According to Dogen, every concrete thing is an event, a 
moment, or an occasion. "In essence, all things in the entire world are linked with 
one another as moments."19 
However, although all the various things of the world are times, Dogen rejects 
the contrast of being and time described in the previous paragraph. Reality as such is 
not composed of times as opposed to beings. For Dogen, just as beings are really 
time, time is really being. Neither category is given any form of ontological prior- 
ity.20 A moment is equally being and becoming: "time, just as it is, is being, and 
being is all time." 21 In order to express this idea, Dogen coins  the  term "being-
time" (uji 有時). Thus, according to Dogen, the world is composed of units of being-
time. Insofar as anything is anything at all, it is a unit  of  being-time. 
What is the character of reality if reality is composed of units of being-time? Each 
unit of being-time is impermanent, Dogen says, and he develops this idea in terms of 
what he calls "flowing." 22 Each unit of being-time "has the quality of flowing.... 
The entire world is not unchangeable, is not immovable. It flows."23 
  
As I see it, Dogen's concept of "flowing" does three jobs. First, it describes the 
fact that all things are dynamic or active. The whole world in which human beings 
live is composed not of inanimate objects and dead matter; rather it moves, and (as 
Dogen sometimes suggests) lives. "Now when dragons and fish see water as a 
palace, it is just like human beings seeing a palace. They do not think it flows. If an 
outsider tells them, 'What you see as a palace is running water,' they will be 
astonished, just as we are when we hear the words, 'Mountains flow'." 24 Thus, to 
say that all things flow means that every unit of being-time is an activity. Every 
concrete thing takes place. 
Second, the word "flow" also describes the kind of activity that all things are, or 
how they are active. Dogen is especially interested in avoiding the suggestion that 
the word "flow" implies that things become or move in any sort of linear direction, 
presumably because this would imply the privilege of either past or future over the 
other. "Do not think that flowing is like wind and rain moving from east to west. . . . 
Flowing is like spring. Spring with all its numerous aspects is called flowing." 25 
Flowing is not a process or a becoming in the teleological sense of realizing poten- 
tial or creative synthesis. Rather, flowing occurs all over, all at once. Each moment is 
a "total dynamic  activity" that  is itself.26  Dogen describes the movement of an 
activity as "ascending and descending up and down."27 "Spring invariably flows 
through spring. Although flowing itself is not spring, flowing occurs throughout 
spring." 28 Each entity/activity is self-sufficient and complete unto itself: "Because 
mountains and waters have been active since before the Empty Eon, they are alive at 
this moment. . . Each, abiding in its phenomenal expression, realizes complete- 
ness."29 "Flowing is completed at just this moment of spring." 30 Dogen also seeks to 
convey this idea that being is really an activity-that-brings-itself-about by making 
nouns into verbs-for example, "entirely worlding the entire world with the whole 
world," "spring passes through spring," "impeding impedes impeding." 31 
Third and last, the concept of flowing describes the relation or continuity of 
things. Flowing is also called walking forward and backward; it is unceasing and it is 
not in one direction. The movement or flow of a unit of being-time is not just forward 
or back, into the future or into the past, but from the past and future into the present 
and within the present itself. "So-called today flows into tomorrow, today flows into 
yesterday, yesterday flows into today. And today flows into today, tomorrow flows 
into tomorrow.”32 “The path of water runs upward and downward and in all 
directions."
33
 
Dogen recognizes that the idea that things are really activities that "flow" con- 
tradicts people's ordinary view of things. From the commonsense standpoint, a thing 
is an object. If there is an activity that is not the activity of something, then the 
apparent activity must not be real after all. An activity without some underlying 
thing that does the activity seems evanescent and detached from reality, like a rela- 
tion or a quality. Dogen opposes this everyday view, saying, "You mustn't by your 
own maneuvers make it a nothingness; you mustn't forcibly make it a being."34 
Although Dogen stresses the creative activity and the interrelated continuity of 
 
 
 
 
  
things, he also notes that each unit of being-time (that is, of reality) is in a sense "cut off" 
and independent of its own past and future. He gives the following example. 
 
Firewood is reduced to ash and cannot become firewood again. So, one should not hold 
the view that ash is succeeding and firewood is preceding. One must know that firewood 
dwells i n the dharma-position of firewood [of which] there is preceding and succeeding. 
Although there is before and after it is cut off from before and after. Ashes are in the 
dharma-position of ashes [of which] there is preceding and succeeding. Just as firewood 
does not become firewood again after it has been reduced to ashes, so man does not 
resume life after death.35 
The central concept here is that of "dwelling in a dharma situation" (juhoi 柱法位). 
Whereas the concept of "flowing" suggests that everything that exists is an activity, 
"dwelling" says that each activity takes place in a particular spatial and temporal 
location. Cut off from its past and future, it seems, each entity/activity is self-sufficient 
and discontinuous from the rest.36 This is not to say that dwelling or abiding in a 
dharma position is a description of stasis: insofar as each abiding moment is not an 
abstraction but rather an actual event, it is involved in the dynamic activity of 
producing itself, all at once. "The sharp, vital quick itself of dharmas dwelling in 
their dharma positions, is being-time.”37 
There is a lack of agreement among Dogen's interpreters on the relation between 
the continuity and the discontinuity of being-time. Does one entity flow into others, 
or are they cut off from each other? For example, Hee-Jin Kim, who summarizes the 
views of some of Dogen's Japanese interpreters, treats discontinuity as primary.38 He 
argues that the idea of dwelling in a dharma position "is a radical rejection of the 
flow of time, or the stream of consciousness, or any other conceptions of time based 
on the idea of continuity and duration. That is, time is absolutely discrete and dis- 
continuous."39 Thomas Kasulis and Steven Heine, on the contrary, say that flowing 
and dwelling represent two perspectives, each of which is true in its own way.40 
They argue that from one perspective time flows, but from the perspective of the 
immediate present (nikon  而今) it abides. 
Though the position of Heine and Kasulis has the advantage of avoiding a 
somewhat static vision of independent being-times, it does so by focusing on "the 
right now" (nikon) rather than dwelling in a dharma position (juhoi), and thus it 
treats both continuity and discontinuity as merely part of the human perspective. In 
my opinion, these two ideas can also be seen as part of reality itself. That is, some- 
thing in reality can be both continuous and discontinuous. In order to see how this is 
so, it pays to reconsider the point Dogen tries to make with these two ideas. 
"Flowing" means that each thing is transient and dynamic; "dwelling" means that 
change is the successive creation of new entities rather than successive change to 
identical entities. To this extent, the two ideas do not contradict each other, but 
rather serve to make the same point that things do not become. Things do not 
perdure; they arise and perish. Birth and death are therefore features not only of 
human experience but also of reality. It is true that each entity/activity is 
independent of its past and future, 
  
but it nevertheless has a past and future and is located in terms of its past and future. 
This is where the idea of "flowing" plays its role, for individual entities/activities are 
related to each other by "flowing." Thus "flowing" does not mean development, but 
can be read as something like "reach" or "influence." Activities flow in the sense 
that the past influences the present and the present the future, but also the future 
influences the future, and the future influences the present. The flow or influence 
between units of being-time is symmetrical or nondual, going in all directions at 
once. In this way, these two important ideas, flowing and abiding, respectively de- 
scribe the continuity and the individuality of each thing in the world. As 
ineliminable aspects of being-time, they, too, are metaphysical attributes, 
describing the character of reality as such. 
My interpretation, then, is that each of Dogen's basic terms- impermanence, 
being-time, flowing, and dwelling in a dharma situation- is meant to describe the 
character of reality as such. Each can be put into a sentence that says "Reality as 
such is-------." All of these are metaphysical characteristics of reality as such or 
things in general. In fact, they imply each other and help to articulate the nature of 
things. 
 
The Religious Significance of Dogen's Metaphysics. 
Dogen does not adumbrate his metaphysical views simply for the sake of 
philosophy. Again and again, as Dogen speaks of the nature of the things, he tells 
his listeners or readers, "You should reflect and learn the meaning of this. If you 
do not learn to be free from your superficial views, you will not be free from the 
body and mind of a superficial person. Then you will not understand the land of 
the buddha ancestors, or even the land or the palace of ordinary people."41 For 
Dogen, meta-physics has liberating or religious significance. 
The religious significance of D6gen's metaphysical claim that all things are 
impermanent is twofold. On the one hand, impermanence identifies the 
unavoidable character of human existence and so, wrongly appreciated, is the 
source of suffering. On the other hand, rightly understood, impermanence is 
actually that which makes liberation possible. A metaphysical claim thus provides 
a description of both the problem of human existence and its solution. 
According to Dogen, what is true of the extrahuman world is also true of human 
existence: it is composed of being-time, and it flows. "Such is the fundamental rea- 
son of the way: that our self is time."42 Human existence, like the existence of all 
things, is impermanent, transient, and already in the process of dissolution. For 
human existence, however, this impermanence leads to suffering: "Our present 
body, we should realize, consists of a temporary union of the four elements 
and the five aggregates. Therefore we are always afflicted with the eight kinds of 
suffering." 43 This fact that life is impermanent leads to anxiety and fear of loss, and 
especially the loss of one's own life. Typical is this statement: 
 
We know neither when nor where our transient life will end. This body is already beyond 
our control; and life, at the mercy of time, moves on without stopping for even an instant. 
 
 
 
  
Once the ruddy face of youth has disappeared, it is impossible to find even its traces. 
When we think about time carefully, we find that time, once lost, never returns. Faced 
suddenly with the prospect of death, kings, state ministers, relatives, servants, wife and 
children, and rare jewels are of no use. We must enter the rea l m of death alone, 
accompanied only by our good and bad ka rma.44 
This problem, call it the problem of birth and death or the problem of time, is the 
central problem of Dogen's Zen. "The thorough clarification of the meaning of birth 
and death-this is the most important problem of all for Buddhists."45 
The first step in solving the problem of birth and death is to realize that one is in 
fact subject to change-for some are ignorant of or deny even this.46 To become 
aware of it requires reflecting on the human condition. This may require an "event11 
in which the transience of life is brought home to one, as when, for example, 
according to legend, Dogen first experienced the impermanence of all things on 
watching the ascending incense at his mother's funeral.47 But even if not 
recognized, impermanence is inevitable: "Since our human body is subject to 
birth and decay, no matter how ardently we may love it we cannot keep it from 
change." 48 In other words, it is a necessary feature of human life that it is 
permeated with impermanence. 
According to Dogen, one has a natural disposition to deny that one is 
impermanent. One wants to believe that the self is really permanent. For Dogen, 
this attitude shows an attachment to self that leads to suffering. Impermanence is 
contrasted with something substantial, Buddha-nature or Nirvana, which one can 
hold to and rely on. To realize that one is impermanent, however, is to welcome 
the impermanence of the world as one's own truth.49 One should, so to speak, 
internalize impermanence. Dogen here uses being-time as a verb: "you should 
being time thus." 50 Therefore there is the following relation between the world and 
human existence: the world is impermanent; the self may choose whether or not to 
realize this. To realize the truth that the self is no less impermanent than the world is 
selflessness. As Dogen says, transience exposes desire.51 "When the transient 
nature of the world is recognized, the ordinary selfish mind does not arise."52 This 
realization is total, in that there is no self apart from the cycles of life and death that 
might escape death. One is nothing other than one's changes; to exist as 
anything is impermanence. Conversely, there is no time independent of the 
living and dying of the existent things in the world. When this is realized, one 
ceases to look for the "meaning of life” outside the process of life and death, and 
the problem dissolves.” [B]irth-and-death is itself Nirvana. There is nothing such as 
birth and death to be avoided; there is nothing such as Nirvana to be sought. Only 
when you realize this are you free from birth and death." 53 If one can train oneself 
through diligence, one can see the impermanence of all things, including the lack 
of a permanent self. This very existence is Nirvana. "Birth and death, coming 
and going, are the real body of the Buddha." 
In this way, the metaphysical truth of impermanence provides the solution to the 
problem of birth and death. It is because all things (including oneself) are 
impermanent that one is not "stuck" permanently in a state of suffering. It is 
because all 
  
things are impermanent that Buddhahood is possible. In other words, the very im- 
permanence of things is their Buddha-nature.54 
Since impermanence is Buddha-nature, Buddha-nature is also a metaphysical 
characteristic of reality as such, always and everywhere present. However, to call 
Buddha-nature a metaphysical characteristic of reality as such may suggest that 
Buddha-nature is some special kind of being or entity, and Dogen works hard to 
oppose such interpretations. He spends a great deal of time distinguishing his 
teaching from empirical and supernatural interpretations of Buddha-nature, and one 
could fairly say that Dogen's primary goal is deconstructing this idea, rather than 
stating a position about it. 
You must understand, the "being" that the Buddha-nature makes whole being is not the 
being of being and nonbeing.... Nor does the term whole being mean emergent being; 
nor is it original being, or mysterious being, or anything of the like. And of course it is not 
conditioned being or illusory being. It has nothing to do with such things as mind and 
object, subject and form.55 
 
Buddha-nature is substanceless, formless, unconditioned, neither something nor 
nothing. Nevertheless, the metaphysical interpretation of Buddha-nature is still 
appropriate. Although these negative claims can be read as the rejection of some 
kinds of metaphysics (Buddha-nature is not a primordial or "original" possibility, nor 
is it a "seed" or a mental attribute; Buddha-nature is not Ultimate reality or the 
Absolute), they can also be seen as the endorsement of another kind of 
metaphysics in which Buddha-nature refers to a characteristic that describes all 
things whatsoever. Since Dogen identifies Buddha-nature with impermanence, 
the claim "for any x, x is Buddha-nature" would therefore also be a metaphysical 
statement about what is, a statement about reality that purports to be true under all 
conditions. 
In short, my argument is that a metaphysical interpretation of Dogen is 
appropriate because Dogen's Zen includes or implies a metaphysics, in the following 
way. Metaphysics provides the answer to the question: why should one be 
selfless and nonattached rather than otherwise? The answer is: because everything 
is impermanent, and attachment to self is thus inauthentic, a result of false views. 
This claim that "everything is impermanent" or "empty" is best understood as a 
piece of meta-physics. Thus Dogen's Zen is not a theoretical matter pursued for its 
own sake, but it does include or imply a correct understanding of reality as such 
(and therefore also of human existence as such) that is metaphysical in scope. 
 
Impermanence as Transcendenta l Metaphysics. 
When Dogen says that all things are impermanent or that the entire world flows, I 
have argued that he is speaking of reality as such and is therefore making 
meta-physical claims. I want now to argue that such claims are in fact metaphysical 
in the narrower sense of transcendental claims that are purportedly true under 
all conditions. Although Dogen does not use the phrase "transcendental," he does 
distinguish the character of impermanence (i.e., Buddha-nature) from all other 
things in 
 
 
 
 
  
ways that strongly suggest it. To make this argument, I focus on three passages from 
the Shobogenzo. 
The first passage is Dogen's commentary on the well-known passage from the 
Mahapari-Nirvana Sutra, traditionally read by Mahayana Buddhists as: "All sentient 
beings without exception have the Buddha-nature." 56 Dogen interprets this passage 
to say that "All sentient beings completely are the Buddha-nature." This 
interpretation avoids the idea that Buddha-nature is something that things have 
merely in a potential state, that it is but a part of them. But then Dogen reads (or 
deliberately misreads) the words "without exception have" as "whole being" 
(shitsuu 悉有), a change that creates the ungrammatical sentence "All sentient 
beings whole being the Buddha-nature." Dogen plays on different connotations of 
the phrase "whole being/' and so the reference or the status of whole being is 
decidedly plural.57 Nevertheless, it seems clear that Dogen uses this phrase in 
order to reinterpret this sutra passage in such a way that avoids limiting Buddha-
nature to sentient beings. For Dogen, Buddha-nature is something more inclusive, 
of which sentient beings are but a part: "the words whole being mean sentient 
beings and all beings. That is to say, whole being is Buddha-nature: I call one 
integral entity of whole being 'sentient being'." 58 Dogen is offering a 
r e i n t e r p re ta t i o n  o f  the Buddha's saying that emphasizes the unrestricted 
character of Buddha-nature. It is, as Kim says, de-anthropocentric and de-
biocentric. 59 Moreover, Dogen's reinterpretation also accords with Mahayana anti-
dualism. Dogen rejects the idea that the nature of the self or of experience is 
different in kind from the nature of the world. Buddha-nature would not be true 
under  all conditions  if it were  merely an  attribute  of sentient beings, but Dogen 
is at pains to see that Buddha-nature is not interpreted in this way. 
The second passage that supports the transcendental metaphysics interpretation 
is Dogen's unusual claim that Buddha-nature is permanent: 
 
Permanence is prior to turning. "Prior to turning" is never connected to the aftertraces of 
coming and going, even though [Buddha-nature] turns to severing Wisdom or becomes 
the worldly passions that are severed. Thus it is said to be permanent. 60 
This claim has seemed a difficult one for some interpreters.61 For Dogen, as for the 
Mahayana tradition generally, all concrete things are impermanent. The question is 
whether Buddha-nature  is an exception  to this  rule, an eternal  refuge from  
transience, or  whether Buddha-nature, too, is impermanent. In this passage, Dogen 
seems to contradict his claims that everything is impermanent (a claim he repeats 
again in the very next sentence). 
The metaphysical interpretation of this passage avoids any sense of 
contradiction. By saying that Buddha-nature is permanent, Dogen moves his 
discussion from an empirical description of what the case is under some conditions 
to a metaphysical description of what the case is under all conditions. The 
statement that Buddha- nature is permanent therefore represents not the description 
of a particular thing but rather reflection upon any description. Any description will 
be of an impermanent dharma;  Buddha-nature  or  impermanence  is  the  one  
permanent  part  of  one's 
 
 
 
  
descriptions. Impermanence is not itself impermanent any more than the claim that 
all things are relative is relative to something, or the claim that all things are 
dependent is dependent upon something. "Impermanence is permanent" is, 
according to my reading, another way of saying that impermanence is not itself a 
dharma but rather a transcendental condition for any possible dharma. It is 
nonrestrictive and logically necessary. As Dogen has said, Buddha-nature is not 
the kind of thing that might or might not exist: "the being that Buddha-nature 
makes is not the being of being and nonbeing." 62 
Following this interpretation, the statement that Buddha-nature is permanent 
is a metaphysical claim, not because Buddha-nature is itself an existing thing but 
rather because anything that exists is characterized by it. In fact, for Dogen, to 
say that Buddha-nature is permanent in the sense of a permanent thing would be 
to demean it. The idea that Buddha-nature is a permanent thing or state "should 
only be the foolish thoughts of small minds, limited knowledge spun from 
discriminatory speculation. ‘Buddha' would thus come to be a small, limited 
body, and '[Buddha-]Nature,' narrow restricted activity." 63 Buddha-nature or 
impermanence is not limited, not restricted. 
The third passage that supports the metaphysical interpretation is Dogen's 
statement that impermanence is a characteristic without which nothing is. 
"Mountains are time and seas are time. If they were not, there would be no 
mountains and seas. So you must not say that there is no time in the immediate 
now of mountains and seas. If time is destroyed, mountains and seas are destroyed. 
If time is indestructible then mountains and seas are indestructible."64 I take 
Dogen to be arguing that without impermanence, nothing is. Dogen's project-
including unpacking the concept and the experience of time with the ideas of 
being-time, flowing, and dwelling-therefore represents an analysis of the condition 
of the possibility of existence. To recapitulate, then, in these three passages, 
Dogen seems to be claiming that Buddha-nature  or impermanence  characterizes  
all beings, rather than sentient beings alone; that it forms a permanent aspect of 
one's descriptions of anything; and that it is the possibility of things existing at all. 
Thus impermanence seems to be a transcendental metaphysical feature of reality 
itself. I conclude that Dogen offers impermanence as a metaphysical 
characteristic of reality, in the sense that the statement "x is impermanent”, 
where x is anything at all, is always and everywhere true. 
 
The Conflict of Interpretations 
 
I have argued that Dogen's account of being-time, impermanence, and flow is best 
understood as a set of metaphysical claims about the character of reality as such; 
that Degen implies that the statement "x is impermanent" is a transcendental meta- 
physical statement; and that this interpretation can make sense of the soteriological 
aims of Dogen's writings. The question may arise, however, whether Dogen's claims 
can be accounted for under any other-perhaps less disputed-philosophical 
approach. The primary rivals to the metaphysical interpretation are those inte
  
pretations that compare Dogen to some form of nonmetaphysical phenomenology or 
existentialism. 65 Of these, the most sophisticated, comprehensive, and insightful, in 
my opinion, is that of Thomas Kasulis.66 The rest of this essay sketches his 
phenomenological interpretation of Dogen's philosophy before giving some reasons 
why his rejection of metaphysics in Dogen is not persuasive. 
 
The Phenomenological Interpretation of Dogen. 
Kasulis argues that D6gen is not a metaphysician concerned with the structure of 
reality but rather a phenomenologist concerned with the structure of experience. 
11Rather than trying to develop an epistemological or metaphysical system, Dogen's 
main philosophical concern is to characterize the nature of human experience, 
especially in its preconceptual or prereflective dimension." 67 According to Kasulis, 
Dogen brackets questions about the world independent of experience: 
 
D6gen's tack is to concern himself only with what is experienced. Limiting himself to this, 
he is not concerned with notions of reality outside this process of experiencing 
consciousness.... In this respect, Dogen is implicitly carrying out his own form of 
bracketing and the term phenomenological is surprisingly appropriate to characterize 
the nature of his methodology. 68 
According to Kasulis, Dogen limits himself to talking about experience in a way that 
rules out talking about things except insofar as they are experienced. Kasulis goes so 
far as to deny that for Dogen impermanence or change is an attribute of objects at 
all. "Dogen would reject our commonly held notion that change is in the things 
outside us, that is, a (metaphysical or physical) attribute of objects." 69 Things as they 
exist independently of experience are simply not of philosophical or religious 
interest to Dogen. 
Kasulis argues that not only was Dogen nonmetaphysical but, in relation to the 
Japanese Buddhism of his day, he was antimetaphysical. "[T]he thrust of Dogen's 
thought is precisely against . .. a metaphysical understanding of Zen." 70 Dogen's 
goal was to reverse the reification of Buddhist ideas. "In Shobogenzo, Dogen takes a 
seemingly metaphysical statement from the T'ien-t'ai or Hua-yen traditions and 
interprets it as a descriptive statement about the structure of a specific experience; in 
effect, he suspends metaphysical and epistemological commitments outside the 
realm of things as experienced." 71 "The implication of Dogen's standpoint is that 
many statements that have been misunderstood as having metaphysical significance 
are actually descriptive statements about experience." 72 
According to Kasulis, Dogen's phenomenological focus has been occluded by 
the metaphysical biases of his Western interpreters. These interpreters have tended 
to translate D6gen's experiential ideas with thing-like terms like "Suchness" instead 
of  "being such," or "absolute reality" instead of "the presencing of things-as-they- 
are."73 Kasulis questions this hypostasis or nominalization of things-as-experienced , 
treating a feature of experience as if it were an independently existing thing. Kasulis 
would replace the interpretation of Dogen that says that for Dogen the person 
"overcomes illusion and experiences directly the manifestation of absolute reality" 
  
 
with the phenomenological version: "the person overcomes his delusion and experiences 
directly the presencing-of-things-as-they-are."74 
According to Kasulis, the goal of Zen philosophy is  to distinguish  different modes  of 
consciousness  and argue that  some  modes  are  more complete,  more creative, and more 
self-expressive than others.75 Dogen argues for these claims by appealing to "what is 
fundamental in all experience," namely a prereflective dimension of experience that 
Dogen calls "without thinking." Kasulis analyzes the idea of "without-thinking" as a mode 
of consciousness that neither affirms nor negates its content; it does not objectify its 
content, and it offers a non-positional noetic attitude and the pure presence of things as they 
are as the noematic content. "Without-thinking is distinct from [other modes of 
consciousness] precisely in its assuming no intentional attitude whatsoever: it neither 
affirms nor denies, accepts nor rejects, believes nor disbelieves. In fact, it does not objectify 
either implicitly or explicitly… In short, it is a nonconceptual or prereflective mode of 
conscious- ness."76 Kasulis gives as an example of this mode of consciousness the 
everyday experience in which, "after mowing the lawn, an exhausted man leans his arm on 
the lawnmower and rests."77 ln this state, the content of one's experiences is simply the 
presencing of things as they are. This state of "without-thinking" serves as the touchstone 
from which the enlightened person decides how to respond to the world without the prejudice 
of conditioning. 
 
The Question of Metaphysics. 
In my opinion, what Kasulis calls his de-metaphysicalization of Dogen-de-reifying 
concepts, removing Western ideas of the Absolute and the One-does  more to clarify the aims 
of Dogen's philosophy than any other interpretation. I believe Kasulis has accurately 
uncovered the phenomenological dimension of Dogen. 
However, this phenomenological interpretation of Dogen, uncovering "what is 
fundamental in all experience," does not yet contradict a metaphysical interpretation. That 
is, the phenomenological and the metaphysical interpretations agree that Dogen is interested 
in the necessary features of human experience. Unfortunately, Kasulis rejects the claim that 
Dogen is also interested in the necessary features of reality. This section argues that this 
negative claim is false. 
Though Kasulis does not define his use of the term "metaphysics, " one can get a sense of 
what he means through his descriptions of what Degen rejects. It turns out that Kasulis uses 
the term "metaphysics" in two senses. The first is the pre-Kantian definition of metaphysics as 
an inquiry into the nature of things as they are, independent of experience, or speculation 
about the thing-in-itself. Thus, Kasulis contends that for Dogen "[t]here is no 'absolute' 
reality; there is only what is. There is nothing behind this world that is waiting to be manifested; 
there is just the presenting of what-is."78 Kasulis rightly argues that this idea of a reality 
beyond experience is alien to Dogen. Second, Kasulis conceives of metaphysics as the 
characterization of things in themselves as unchanging essences, or, in other words, he 
identifies meta- physics and substance metaphysics. "Simply stated, impermanence is not a 
meta-physical, but a phenomenological, category for Dogen: no things are directly expe- 
 
 
 
  
rienced as substantial in the sense of having a changeless essence." 79 Again, Kasulis 
rightly argues that this idea is not Dogen's; in fact, it is an idea Dogen consistently 
combats. Thus, when Kasulis argues that Dogen rejects metaphysics, he means that 
Dogen neither aspires to the knowledge of things independent of experience nor 
conceives of things as unchanging substances. 
Neither of these two ideas, however, is intrinsic to what metaphysics involves. 
Kasulis does not explore either the possibility of a metaphysics that seeks to describe 
the necessary features of things-as-experienced or the idea that the nature of these 
entities might be that of process, becoming, or "flow." Consequently, the disagree- 
ment between the phenomenological and the metaphysical interpretations of Dogen 
may turn on definitions. Perhaps what I attribute to Dogen as "metaphysics" Kasulis 
might recognize under some other name, such as "phenomenological ontology" or 
the like. If we agree that Dogen rejects both the idea of things in themselves and 
substance metaphysics, then we might also agree that Dogen has an interest in the 
nature of reality as such, understood in this way as not independent of experience. 80 
However, I believe that Kasulis would not agree (or he overlooks) that Dogen 
has an interest in the nature of reality as such because Kasulis himself rejects the 
possibility of metaphysics, even as understood in my sense. Although he does not 
make an antimetaphysical argument explicitly, Kasulis' talk of "conceptual over- 
lays"81 and, indeed, the very idea of phenomenology imply that he believes that 
knowledge can only be of things as they appear, not of things as they really are. 
Knowledge is thereby "limited" to phenomena, as opposed to noumena. Kasulis' 
rejection of metaphysics seems to be based on a Kantian distinction between 
mediated knowledge and the world in itself. 
If Kasulis rejects metaphysics because he believes that we have no access to 
things in themselves, then his rejection is based on a spurious distinction. The 
metaphysical interpretation of Dogen, as I have presented it, does not deny but 
rather insists that we have no such access. It insists, that is, that one cannot mean- 
ingfully conceive of objects independent of human experience, or, in other words, 
that conceivable objects are the only objects that can be meaningfully discussed. If, 
therefore, Dogen is right that things as experienced are necessarily impermanent, 
that impermanence is fundamental to the experience of things, then it follows 
(according to the metaphysical interpretation of Dogen) that insofar as one can have 
any knowledge of any thing whatsoever, that thing will be impermanent. Following 
this interpretation, there is no knowledge of things, nor can one even conceive of 
things, that are not impermanent. Hence impermanence is a property of things 
insofar as they are anything at all, a necessary property of things as such. Given 
the conceivability of things in themselves, as Kant held, there can be no further 
meta-physics in the sense of inquiry into the nature of reality as such. But 
lacking any access to a noumenal realm, phenomenological claims when they 
describe the features of things as they necessarily "appear" are recognized as 
metaphysical claims describing the necessary features of things as such.82 
In short, the difference between the two positions is this. According to the 
phenomenological interpretation, change or impermanence is only a feature of 
experience.
  
According to the metaphysical interpretation, change or impermanence is also the 
metaphysical condition of the possibility of anyt hing whatsoever. Imperma- nence 
is thus independent of the existence of any sentient being; in other words, even if 
there were no sentient beings, the statement "something is impermanent" would 
still be true. According to the metaphysical interpretation, Buddha-nature is the 
necessary character of reality as such, reflected in but not exhausted by the 
consciousness of sentient beings. Despite the fact that impermanence is fundamental 
in all experience (as Kasulis and I agree), sentient experience is not the only place 
where impermanence is found. In my opinion, Dogen himself recognizes the 
possibility of a phenomenological interpretation of his work but warns interpreters 
not to "phenomenalize" the metaphysical character of Buddha-nature when he 
comments on the traditional analogy in which the relation of Buddha-nature to the 
mind is like the moon reflected in water. As Dogen says, "one should fully examine 
the water's smallness, and clearly discern the size of the moon."83 The character 
of Buddha- nature is not limited to the experiencing mind. It is "both within and 
without sentient beings."84 
If the argument of this essay has been successful, the recognition of Dogen's 
metaphysics has two benefits. First, it helps us better understand Dogen (and Zen 
philosophy in general) by clarifying the philosophical status of some of Dogen's 
claims; it identifies the kind of claims he makes, their object and scope. Second, the 
metaphysical interpretation identifies a question common to Dogen and Western 
philosophical and theological traditions, namely "what is the character of reality as 
such?" Metaphysics thereby provides not only common ground for possible dia- 
logue, but also criteria by which one might assess rival answers. 
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